

CHAPTER TWO

“God-Language” and the Existence of God

The God we believe in might not be the God who exists.

The Thirteenth Century A.D.

Dominican, theologian and philosopher, Thomas Aquinas stated "Philosophy is not about what men say but about the way things are". We are all aware words are quicker than actions and saying that something should be done is independent from doing what should be done. Thus, **to say** that God exists is irrelevant to the fact whether or not God exists. **To say God exists** does not mean **that God exists**! Also, to say that God does not exist is irrelevant to the fact whether or not God does not exist. As a matter of fact, "to say" that God exists or does not exist has no necessary relation to the fact of God's existence or non-existence. So, both the fact that saying is not doing and to say that something is is irrelevant to whether or not something is so attest to the independence of verbal reality from existential reality. Indeed, Aquinas concludes that both mental existence and its verbal statement are different from and dependent upon existential reality, so human thought follows upon and is dependent upon existential being. Human truth, in other words, must conform to existential truth in order to avoid error.

Of course, this thirteenth century A.D. view has an *Old Testament* origin within the book of *Exodus*. After Moses was chosen to be the “mouthpiece” of Yahweh, he argued “Who am I to go to Pharaoh and bring the sons of Israel out of Egypt... But if they ask me what his name is, what am I to tell them?” (*Exodus: 3: 11-15*). Yahweh replied: And God said to Moses, “I am who I am. This is what you must say to the sons of Israel: ‘I am has sent me to you’”. So, even the *Old Testament* God lays claim to the characteristic of “being”, that is, “am who am” a “no name” reality which claims to be the origin of being itself.

But, "saying so" or "Saying not so" about the existence or kind of existence of anything proves or disproves nothing except the person's belief who is saying "yes" or "no". But, just as scientists must test their beliefs about truth - indeed, the so-called “positivistic” scientists have beliefs about truth, such as the belief that truth is different than falsehood -- so also must believers test their beliefs about God according to the “way things are”. Thus, saying so or not so merely tells us about the saying person's state of mind or understanding of the issue, or both.

Whether or not a tree falling within a forest makes noise depends upon the

The *Old Testament* God created “male and female” in Ywhh’s image and likeness.

meaning or definition of “noise”. If noise is defined as certain wave lengths of sound, then the falling tree makes noise whether or not our ears are present to “hear” that noise. If to the definition of certain wave lengths of sound, we add “heard” by a “receptor”, then a further variable is required, namely, that the “receptor” be on the same frequency as the sound waves produced, whether that receptor be the ears of a bird or a human being. Believers and non-believers are notorious for being on different frequencies; although they might listen, they do not hear each other.

So also, whether or not God exists depends upon the meaning or definition of “God”. To define “God” as black and white existence, depends upon whether or not we understand “black and white existence”. Of course, if the person with whom we are discussing “black and white existence” is blind from birth, then that person can not understand because that person has no experience of black, white, or any color within the color spectrum. Furthermore, if the person with whom we are discussing “existence”, has no perception of existence, separate, or even distinct from what the person “thinks” or conceptualizes existence to be, then that person can not understand because to exist exceeds to think humanly and to conceive mentally since each existing thing is a kind of way to exist. So, Berkeley’s often quoted comment, *esse est percipi*, or to be is to be perceived is both correct and incorrect. But, the human being who limits *what is true* to his or her understanding of what is true is reduced to what he or she thinks is true and, thereby deprived of any truth about which he or she has not thought!

This situation prevails in respect to any human knowledge. At least three elements are required for to know, hear, see and so forth: first, the “certain wave lengths”, secondly, the “receptor” and finally, that the “receptor” be “tuned in”. So, whether God exists and how God exists is the single set of questions which are relevant and whether or not the three variables are available and operative is the issue to be determined. Augustine, in his *On Religion* states simply that the question of God's existence is not the belief that God exists, but whether or not that belief is reasonable and has a basis in knowledge, so, he developed his view, *fides quaerens intellectum*, faith seeking understanding (through reason).

How do we know that the God we believe in is not merely a “narcissistic” projection?

Indeed, most believers, usually the most vocal about their beliefs, make no distinction between believing that God exists and asking the question: whether or not God does exist, independent of belief or non-belief? Furthermore, the majority of this "most" has no other basis for the existence of God than their own unquestioned denominational belief. In other words, such believers not only do not consider whether or not God exists, but they do not distinguish *the God that exists* from *the kind of God in which they believe*. Xenophane's criticism targets this problem.

If oxen or lions had hands which enabled them to draw and paint pictures as men do, they would portray their gods as having bodies like their own; horses would portray them as horses and oxen as oxen
(Frag. # 6)

If "to exist is to be perceived", then whatever exists and wherever it exists would be perceived by each human whenever the human perceived anything.

If the human will seeks the good which human reason presents, then the self-knowledge of the believer is the primary basis for a human's "knowledge" of God and the object of that person's belief in God. Yet, if this parallels the human experience accurately, then a believer who does not distinguish the God that exists from the kind of God in which the believer believes merely projects a kind of God mirroring his or her self-knowledge. Historically, this is known as **gnosticism**, a type of "sacred" narcissism. So, such a belief in God becomes nothing more or less than Shakespeare's "wish being father to a thought". Thus, not only some believers do not know whether or not God exists, but neither do they think about the possibility that the God which exists might be different from the God they believe exists. The net result is that their view of God is literally irrational, that is, their belief has no basis in nature or human reason. Consequently, this irrationality quite probably characterizes their religious actions, thus resulting in them being "fanatics". The practice of their belief, therefore, becomes proof to reasonable observers that religion is merely for fanatics and God is a figment of fanatical imagination. (Of course, we must not exclude non-believers from this category of "fanatics". After all, non-believers believe that God does not exist, so they also have something to prove!)

Just as who we are is determined by how we act, so our human access to whether or not God exists and who God is must be determined by the presence of God through actions. In other words, our access to the existence of God, just as our access to the existence of anyone whom we might meet, is limited to the words and actions of that person. Yet, as noted above, **Genesis**, literally the birth or origin, describes the creation of the human being in God's "image and likeness". Thus, an additional complication occurs in our ability to "know" God, if God does

exist, but only 6th century B.C. Xenophanes, seems to have addressed this problem.

That complication is this: if the *Genesis* statement is true, then the believer will find the presence and image of God reflected in the believer's own being human. This is a complication because the God human beings decide exists, and the God human beings describe, is characterized more by the human's self-image than by the actual action and presence of God. In other words, the God we think exists could be more like the self we conceive ourselves to be than like the being who God is.

Xenophanes of Colophon, a sixth century B.C. Presocratic wrote about just such a complication. As a result, civic leaders accused him of being an atheist and exiled him from Colophon. Xenophanes fled to Zancle, then Catana, Sicily where he lived and wrote poetry, arguing against both Hesiod and Homer and the Greek manner of anthropomorphizing God:

The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that theirs have light blue eyes and red hair. (*Fragment # 171*)

Xenophanes was convinced that God could not be conceived through human reason or expressed through human language - Lao-tzu replicates these convictions

One God, greatest among gods and men, in no way similar to mortals either in body or in thought. (*Fragment # 173*)

But mortals consider that the gods are born, and that they have clothes and speech and bodies like their own. (*Fragment # 170*)

The realism of Xenophanes is amazing, given the Greek poetic and Presocratic penchant for portraying God(s) as having human passions, virtues and vices, as Hesiod did within his *Theogony*, or "birth of God". Yet, Xenophanes was adamant:

No man knows, or ever will know, the truth about the gods and about everything I speak of: for even if one chanced to say the complete truth, yet oneself knows it not; but seeming is wrought over all things in the case of all men. (*Fragment # 189*)

The fact is that Xenophanes not only warned against anthromorphizing God, but also described the manner according to which we might speak

about God. Xenophanes not only seems to reflect that oriental view of God being inexpressible and unknowable, but also anticipated the linguistic view of analogy developed nineteen (19) centuries later by Thomas Aquinas:

How do we know that the God we believe in is not merely a "narcissistic" projection?

The Latin word Aquinas uses for "demonstration" is *probate*; Lawyers use this word when they speak of "probating a will". Literally, the word means "to test", like a surgical "probe" which comes from the same root word. The first meaning of this Latin verb is to make or find good, to approve; the second meaning is to judge by a certain standard; the third, to recommend as good and the fourth is to show, point out, finally "to demonstrate" in the same way as the Latin word characterizes a "demonstrative pronoun," literally, one which points something out, as in the example: That is my God.

Just as language is fundamental for human understanding, so definitions of words are essential for human communication.

Language is fundamental for human understanding. This is why translations are

an imprecise way to learn a person's thought. Indeed, the oriental Okakura comments:

Translation is always a treason and, as a Ming author observes, can at its best be only the reverse side of a brocade - all the threads are there, but not the subtlety of color or design. But, after all, what great doctrine is there which is easy to expound? The ancient sages never put their teaching in systematic form. They spoke in paradoxes, for they were afraid of uttering half-truths. They began by talking like fools and ended by making their hearers wise. (*The Book of Tea*)

Such translated words are "second hand", or, in an American Court of law, "hearsay" evidence. Words can give life just as quickly as they can take life away - "I love you" is just as life-lifting as "I hate you" is life-taking. But, words can provide intellectual life and understanding just as quickly as they can stunt life or kill understanding. This seems why we are up-lifted by people who ask us "what do you mean" before they tell us "you do not know what you are saying". Since words have such power, we must use them wisely, particularly when seeking the "truth" and especially when discussing a topic such as the existence or non-existence of God.

Before considering any of Aquinas' five ways of *pointing out*, or *testing* God's existence, consider what other "ways" human beings might arrive at the existence of God that Aquinas had rejected. First, some held that God was an innate, literally, an in-born idea within the human mind; secondly, some held that the very statement *God exists* is in and of itself true and for which the opposite is impossible. Aquinas rejected the first view because it would mean human beings as limited, or created had immediate knowledge of God whom the *Old Testament* teaches is "I am who am" and Aristotle reasons to as *Pure Act* within his *Me-ta-physics*; such then is both scripturally and philosophically impossible. That some claimed direct and immediate knowledge of God resulted in what the Early Catholic Bishops condemned as the heresy of *Gnosticism* in the third century A.D. (Aquinas argued against such a thought even though one of the most influential Fathers of the Church, St. John Damascene argued and taught that it was true.)

Aquinas also rejected the second option, even though another great and popular

When the leaves of a tree move, we conclude *that the breeze is blowing*.

Father of the Church, St. Anselm taught and argued that the non-existence of God is literally, *inconceivable*. Anselm stated that the human mind **can not think** "that God does not exist", and, if the human being understood the proposition *God is that than which no greater can be thought*, then the human being would understand that God necessarily exists -- this argument is traditionally known as Anselm's *ontological argument*. Aquinas rejected Anselm's supposition, namely, that the type of existence human thoughts have differs from the type of existence objects outside the human mind enjoy. So, Aquinas states that the human being's knowledge of God is only by reflection and by analogy. *Analogy* has a Greek derivation: *ana* means *parallel to, along side of*; *loge* means *reason or reasoning*. Thus, the basic meaning of *analogy* means to reason in a parallel manner so that the statement becomes a comparative one and means something similar to, yet different from that to which it is compared. So a metaphor is a type of analogy when we say "he runs like the wind"; "she has the beauty of Venus"; or "he has the body of Michelangelo's David".

Then, Aquinas argues that by reflecting upon nature and the various operations of nature the human being arrives at the conclusion *that God exists*. He observes that whatever exists between beings and that Being called "God" is literally a *relationship within being*. Therefore, whenever humans express this relationship, they must do so through argument by analogy. Aquinas then calls the

reader to reflect on five ways nature operates and to use analogical thinking to determine whether or not that God exists.

The reasoning begins with the most obvious reality humans perceive through their senses, namely, movement, birds flying, clouds sailing across the sky, humans walking. So, first, analyze and argue from the fact of *moving*, secondly, from the fact of *causing*, thirdly from the consideration of the relation between the *possible* and the *necessary*, fourthly from the consideration of various *gradations* within beings, such as degrees of *good*, of *truth*, or *nobility*, finally, from reflection on the *generating of things* in the case of non-thinking beings, for instance, such as an arrow moving toward a bulls-eye, or a rock being thrown toward a target.

Aquinas draws his approach from that of Aristotle, specifically, the works on *Physics*, or, *Nature* and *Me-ta-physics*, or *After the Nature*. Aristotle studies "motion" within the *Physics*; he seeks the first principles of "motion" within nature and arrives at four kinds of principles which he calls *aitia*, "cause(s)": material, formal, efficient and final cause(s). He concludes that these four kinds of causes provide an explanation of the movement of a physical being from point "a" to point "b". Aristotle studies "thinking" within the *Me-ta-physics*; he seeks the first principles of the act of human thinking and concludes **that** the First Principle of human thinking is *Nous*, literally, thought-thinking-on-thought. Aristotle calls this "Pure Act", literally "Being Itself".

Humans communicate through multiple word uses: univocal, equivocal and analogous.

The key to understand Aquinas' "five ways" and the five conclusions "that God exists" is to understand Aristotle's findings within the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. The one thing the "five ways" have in common is that all focus on the "act" of the five kinds of activity. Motion, for instance, is the act of a physical being from rest (a state which has the potential "to move") at point "a" on its way (the actuality of that potential) to point "b" and a new state of rest (a new potential state "to move" to a point "c").

Aristotle and Aquinas contend that a moved-physical-being might have a self-moved mover as the cause of a "moving" from a point "a" to a point "b", but no physical being as composed of both a potential and an actual principle can of itself be the cause of its "act" whether that act be the act of moving, or any other acting. This reasoning is based on the fact that any being moved from point "a" to point "b" cannot be the source of its own "moving", otherwise it would not be "moved" but always "moving" from point "a" to point "b"; thus, the net result

would mean a violation of the logical principle of non-contradiction, that is, a being both could be and not be in the same respect at the same time - a moving being both could be potential to and actual in respect to moving at the same time and in the same respect. Aristotle reasons that any "moved" must have a "mover" which is self-moving, otherwise the "moved" could not be "moving". Yet, he observes even this "self-moving" is itself in a potential state to this specific "moving" from point "a" to point "b"; therefore, Aristotle reasons, on the horizontal plane of moving from point "a" to a point "b," an un-moved mover is required as the source of this particular "moving" from point "a" to point "b".

However, on this horizontal plane, requiring as it does a tactile relationship between the "moved"

If paper is flammable, then a fiery match cause is necessary to reduce that flammability into flaming paper.

and the "mover", any "un-moved mover" of necessity will have to be related materially to the "moved" and therefore, the act of "moving" still lacks a cause for the "actuality" of the "moving" because even the "un-moved mover" will be "potential" to the actuality of the "moving" from point "a" to point "b". But, since the "moving" from point "a" to point "b" is a fact of our human perception, and since the source of the actuality of the "moving" cannot be accounted for by our seeking a tactile material cause on the horizontal plane of motion because such a search would proceed to infinity on this horizontal level, thereby precluding the act of moving which we perceive to occur, we must look for a cause of the "actuality" of the "moving" on a vertical basis and conclude that Pure Act exists as the cause which will explain the fact of the actuality of the "moving" from point "a" to point "b".

So, concludes Aquinas, the fact that physical beings move locally, from any one point to any other point "probrates" the fact that God exists. So, God "IS PURE ACT" and is the cause of any "act" of any potency within composed beings - moving, thinking, even existing. Actually, all of us reason in such a common sense manner when, for instance, we look out of the window and see leaves on the branch of a tree moving. The leaves might be green and alive, however, the additional fact that they were not and then are moving leads us to "look for some actual moving force" to account for this movement of the leaves on the tree branch. We conclude that this "actual moving force" exists and we call it "wind" or "breeze", although we can not see wind or breeze except by its presence through the movement of something which prior to its presence was not moving. This parallels the reasoning which Aristotle and Aquinas use to conclude **that God exists because beings composed of the capability to act and to exist actually act and exist**, something these composed beings could not do, unless they themselves

continuously acted and never acted and then stopped acting in a particular way. Then Aquinas repeats this basic reasoning in the subsequent four "ways".

Perhaps an analogy will assist your understanding both of Aristotle's conclusion of "Pure Act" in the *Me-ta-physics* and Aquinas' "ways" in the *Summa Theologicae*. Place a piece of paper and pen on the desk or table before you. Both have a "potential", the paper to be written upon, the pen to write. Indeed, look at your hand, your wrist, your forearm, your body. It has the "potential" to the act of writing. Now, reflect upon your mind and notice that it is in the act of thinking; your mind thinks about the "potential" of your body, forearm, wrist, hand and pen. Then, you think: "writing is the act of my body's and pen's potential to write". Finally, your will and your mind's act of thinking "activates" that "potential" and your body, forearm, wrist and hand moves to pick up the pen and you write: "writing is the act of my body's and pen's potential". In other words, the act of writing results from your will's and mind's actuality of the body's and pen's potential. Yet, this particular "will and mind actuality" is unique, so even though the will and mind are the source of the actuality of this individual bodily movement, the very actuality of this combined individual movement still requires a source of the mutual actuality of will, mind and body in this individual movement act. This source we call "Pure Act", or God.

Take the example of a match on fire. The "fiery match" has the actuality which ignites the potential of the paper to catch on fire. The "fiery match" and the paper become "one" in this individual act of "paper on fire". Again, however, this "fiery actuality of match and paper" is unique, so the need exists to find an actuality for the "fiery" which even the match was potential to possess before it was struck to be "fiery". Thus, the necessity exists that something possessing actuality sufficient to cause any actuality, including that of the "fiery" actuality of the match, and that is the "Pure Act" which Aristotle describes as "thought-thinking-on-thought" and Aquinas calls "God".

So, any motion, any operation, any action which is the

The "actuality" of a capability requires something more than "the person is capable"; it requires an actual causing agent possessing the perfection for which the person has the capability.

actuality of a potency and presumes that something is actual in respect to the potential requires "that something" which we call "actuality" so that the mutual potentiality of self-moved mover and its moved-mover can become actual. Thus, the wind must be blowing (or some equivalent) in order for the leaves to be

moving. This basic approach and reasoning needs to be applied to each of the "five ways" Aquinas uses to probate the existence of God.

Analogy, Language, History and Metaphor

Mircea Eliade comments about myth, from the perspective of the historian of religion within

Myth provides an explanation of how things happened historically and gives meaning to things existentially.

The Quest; History and Meaning of Religion:

...mythology not only constitutes, as it were, the 'sacred history' of the tribe, not only does it explain the total reality and justify its contradictions, but it equally reveals a hierarchy in the series of fabulous events that it reports. In general, one can say that any myth tells how something came into being, the world, or man, or an animal species, or a social institution, and so on. But by the very fact that the creation of the world precedes everything else, the cosmogony enjoys a special prestige. In fact...the cosmogonic myth furnishes the model for all myths of origin. The creation of animals, plants, or man presupposes the existence of the world. (*The Quest; History and Meaning in Religion*, Mircea Eliade (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1969, p. 75)

Myth, therefore, provides both an explanation of how things happened historically, and gives meaning to things existentially. Myth also uses biology as the means to explain historical origins, since human beings themselves owe their origins and their continued existence to biology, as Xenophanes realized. The question is: when religious people retell or recall these myths, as occurs in Old Testament, Genesis, how do they use words and, what do they mean by these verbal explanations?

Joseph Campbell teaches myths are metaphors, "psychologically symbolic...derived from the material world and its supposed history" and "metaphysically grounded...beyond space and time...known only to the mind". (The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, Harper & Row, New York, N.Y., 1986, p. 55) Campbell explains metaphor by reference to and use of Immanuel Kant's *Prolegomena To Any Further Metaphysics*. Campbell cites Kant's four-term analogy:

a is to b or a c

as _____ : _____
c is to x b x

This analogy, Campbell explains, points to:

a perfect resemblance of two relationships between quite dissimilar things: not 'a somewhat resembles b', but 'the relationship of a to b perfectly resembles that of c to x', where x represents a quantity that is not only unknown but absolutely unknowable -- which is to say, is metaphysical. (*Ibid.*, pp. 56-57)

Kant, he says, demonstrates the formula in two examples:

(1) As the promotion of the happiness of the children(a) is related to the parents' love (b), so is the welfare of the human race (c) to that unknown in God (x) which we call God's love; and (2) The causality of the highest cause (x) is precisely, in respect to the world (c), what human reason (b) is in respect to the work of human art (a). (*Ibid.*, p. 57)

Kant's "analogy" would then be:

children's happiness art work human race world
 _____ as _____ as _____ as _____
 parents' love human reason God's love highest cause

Campbell then observes that where this analogical use of terms is not understood and these metaphors are taken as facts:

there have been ferocious wars waged between the parties of such contrary manners of metaphoric representation. The Bible abounds in examples. And today (1984-85), in the formerly charming little city of Beirut, the contending zealots of three differing inflections even of the same idea of a single paternal 'god' are unloading bombs on each other. (*Ibid.*, p. 58)

Notwithstanding Campbell's comment, his identification of analogy with metaphor is

Myth is more than metaphor, as Campbell says because symbol is more than similarity.

not entirely correct because he does not describe the uniqueness of the metaphor by comparing it to the simile. A metaphor implies the similarity as it substitutes or identifies the figurative term with the literal term. Shakespeare, for example, writes in "Spring" that "merry larks are ploughman's clocks" and Tennyson in "Eagle" states "He clasps the crag with crooked hands". A simile, however, expresses the comparison through a likeness with adverbs. Again, Tennyson describes the Eagle when he says "And like a thunderbolt he falls". "She runs like the wind" is another simile. Yet, poetry does offer us an insight into analogy as poetry depends upon analogy. Robert Frost comments:

Poetry provides the one permissible way of saying one thing and meaning another.

Poetry, therefore, allows humans the luxury of saying more than words can express. So, too myth uses poetry as its medium to express the inexpressible, as we shall see.

Thomas Aquinas: the Meaning of Analogical Speaking

Generally, Aquinas states analogy means that two things are proportional when one is related to the other as a third thing is to a fourth:

$$\frac{\text{one}}{\text{other}} :: \frac{\text{third thing}}{\text{fourth thing}}$$

We may look at this relationship of one to the other in two ways. First, two things can have diverse relations to one thing. Our use of the word **health** provides an example. We speak of urine and medicine as healthy. Medicine is healthy as a cause of health; whereas a laboratory technician analyzes the urine of an animal as being healthy. Proportional examples look like this:

$$\frac{\text{urine}}{\text{health}} :: \frac{\text{sign}}{\text{signed}} \qquad \frac{\text{medicine}}{\text{health}} :: \frac{\text{cause}}{\text{caused}}$$

Therefore, urine is related to medicine as a third thing to a fourth, namely, as a sign of health to a cause of health.

<u>urine</u>	::	<u>sign</u>	<u>health</u>
medicine			cause

So, urine and medicine are analogously one in healthiness.

Secondly, two things also can have the same proportion to diverse things. Our use of the word **tranquility** provides an example. We speak of sea and air as being tranquil. Proportional examples look like this:

<u>tranquility</u>	::	<u>serenity</u>
sea		air

of the sea is tranquility.

So, the quiet

of the air is serenity.

Therefore, tranquility relates to serenity as a third thing does to a fourth, namely, as the quiet of the sea relates to the quiet of the air. So, tranquility and serenity are analogously one in quietness.

As a result of these diverse relationships, we predicate or use words of our ideas and/or our experiences in three ways. We speak of them intentionally, but not existentially, or existentially, but not intentionally, or both intentionally and existentially. The following examples explain each of these three ways of speaking or of using words.

I. We humans speak intentionally, but not existentially, when something which has existence in only one thing is referred to several things both before and after (traditionally, prior and posterior). We say, for instance, that an animal is healthy, urine is healthy and a diet is healthy. Properly speaking, however, health resides within an animal, because only animals are healthy; but, proper diet is an antecedent requirement in order for an animal to be healthy and the animal's urine is a consequent proof that the animal is healthy.

A diagram provides a picture of these relationships: diet (of animal), to the urine of the animal, to the health of the animal in an inverse relationship:

the health of the animal is seen in the urine of the animal and is caused by the diet of the animal.

So we intend health to mean different, yet similar things in relation to the animal, diet and urine. Although we use the same word, we speak of a diet as prior to and urine as posterior to the healthy animal, but we intend to say that it is the animal which is healthy.

II We humans speak existentially, but not intentionally. We speak in this way when many things are equalized in the intention of something common, but the common thing does not have the same kind of existence in all of them. We say, for instance, that all earthly bodies are corporeal. Plants, animals and humans, for example, are corporeal.

We speak of all bodies to be the same in the intention of corporeality. Yet, the existence of corporal bodies is not the same in corruptible and incorruptible bodies so the traditional metaphysician and scientist, who consider things as they exist, do not univocally predicate body, or corporal or anything else both of corruptible and incorruptible things. In other words, they do not speak of a human body to be corporeal in the same way as a dog, or carrot body. Even common sense speech makes a distinction between the human body and a body of ideas.

III We humans speak intentionally and existentially. We say, for instance, that substance and accidents both are beings. Or, practically, we speak of John and his red hair as beings. Both John's red hair and John are **real**, or **exist**, yet, not in the same way and not in diverse ways. The **being** of John is more perfect than John's red hair, so we understand that to say that each **exists** means that each shares existence in different degrees. Again, a diagram helps our understanding:

We predicate	being	of substance of John of accident of John's red hair.
--------------	--------------	---

the **being** of John
 We intend that the **being** of John's red hair are similar and different.
the **being** of John has more perfection.

We mean that: the **being** of John's hair has less perfection.

In a similar way, we speak of God as **good**, humans, animals and plants as **good**; we speak of God as **Truth** and the **truth** of humans, animals and plants; we speak of God as **beautiful** and **one** and humans, animals and plants as **beautiful** and **one**. So, we predicate Goodness, Truth, Beauty and Oneness both of God, the creator and creatures. Therefore, all these perfections are related both to God and the creatures of God according to more or less perfection.

So, **Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Unity**
 are predicated analogously
 of
 God of creatures
 Therefore, it is necessary that

All **These**
be in
 God according to God's existence
 creatures according to more or less perfection
 in so far as these share in existence.

We find, however, that two kinds of agreement between and among objects about which we speak according to proportion. So, we find two kinds of analogy are possible: analogy according to agreement of proportion and analogy according to agreement of proportionality. Aquinas uses mathematical examples to illustrate analogy of proportion and analogy of proportionality.

Agreement of Proportion

2 has an agreement with 1
because 2 is the double of 1.

Agreement of Proportionality

6 agrees with 4
because
6 is the double of 3 just as 4 is the double of 2.

We speak of something being analogous with another because both agree according to a specific proportion when we say that one thing has a relation to the other. We say, for instance, that urine and animal are healthy since urine has some likeness to the health of an animal; or we say substance and accidents both exist since accidents have a relation to substance. Red hair, for instance, grows from and adheres in the scalp of a young man.

This type of analogy requires that a determinate relationship exist between or among the items predicated of another common item. So, we shall see that this type of analogy is not the way existence, goodness, truth or unity, for example, are predicated of God and other beings since no determinate or necessary relationship exists between God as creator and the created - of course, Lao-tzu does not treat of, nor show any idea of “creation,” as does the *Old Testament*, however, Lao-tzu would not use analogy of proportion when speaking of *Tao*, the eternal with no name and even *Mother earth*, *yin* and *yang*, or the myriad other *ways* of which he speaks.

We show this determinate relationship in relation to urine and the animal relative to health. Urine voided from any animal necessarily shows the healthy or unhealthy state of the animal from which the urine was voided; a current, practical example is the urine testing to determine whether or not a person uses drugs. A better, more accurate type of testing, involving the same kind of analogy would be using a person’s hair samples to determine whether or not the person is drug free.

We also speak of something being analogous with another according to an agreement of proportionality. We say, for instance, that our physical eyes and our mind’s eye sees. Our physical eyes see colors and our mind’s eye sees, or understands the physics of color. So,

Sight	
is predicated of	
bodily or physical seeing	and mental seeing

because just as seeing is in the eye so understanding is in the mind

<u>seeing (sight)</u>	::	<u>understanding (sight)</u>
eyes (of the body)		mind (of the soul)

We speak of something being analogous with another according to an agreement of proportionality.

This analogy of proportionality requires no determined relation to exist between those things which have something common through analogy, therefore, we use analogy of proportionality as the specific analogy which we speak something such as “good” as common to God and creatures. Moses Maimondes, we shall see, specifies such a type of analogy within the Guide for the Perplexed, as he explains how God and created beings are both “good”. As mentioned, Lao-tzu also uses this analogy of proportionality as he speaks of Tao, the Way and other ways within the tone poems.

So, we see Aquinas, Maimonides and Lao-tzu in agreement that whatever is said of God and creatures, *Yhwh* and creatures, *Tao* and the wise man is said inasmuch as some ordered relationship exists between the creature and the Creator, as the caused to the first principle and cause, or as the imperfect to the perfect, as sharing existence and life in relation to that which is existence and life itself in its fullness. Perhaps, by comparison of Aquinas’ analysis of analogy both with that of Campbell and Kant we can appreciate the difficulty of which Maimonides speaks in the Guide for the Perplexed. We understand how we mean our comparisons, but they are very difficult to explain if someone asks us to do so.